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GET GREEN OR GET OUT: DECOUPLING
ENVIRONMENTAL FROM ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
IN AGRICULTURAL REGULATION
JIM CHEN*
L This Land Is Shattered
A. Agriculture and Ecology: A Misunderstood Relation'
Agriculture, like the earth that feeds it, hangs in the balance.' In the six decades
since the Supreme Court last invalidated a major federal agricultural statute,3 thq
principal means of agricultural regulation and reform have been statutory. The
comprehensive and monumentally ambitious Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
attempted to "conserv[e] national resources" and "prevent[] the wasteful use of soil
fertility" even as it sought to "assist in the marketing of agricultural commodities
for domestic consumption and for export," "assist[] farmers to obtain ... parity
prices for [their] commodities and parity of income, and assist[] consumers to obtain
an adequate and steady supply of such commodities at fair prices."4 Every periodic
"farm bill" since the Agricultural Act of 1949' has attempted to "couple" environ-
mental regulation of American agriculture with the New Deal's basic promise of
© 1995, Jim Chen. All rights reserved.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. This paper was originally
presented on September 20, 1995, at St. Catherine's College, Oxford, England, at the 18th annual
congress of the Comitd Europlen de Droit Rural. Tracey Chabala, Steffen Johnson, and Stephen
Safranski all contributed valuable research assistance.
1. Cf. loosely RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
2. Cf. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992).
3. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933, Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-626
(1994))); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594-98 (1935) (invalidating the
first Frazier-Lemke Act, Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289); cf A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 540-41, 550 (1935) (invalidating the "Live Poultry Code"
promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933). But cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
I 11, 128-29 (1942) (repelling a commerce clause challenge to the 1938 Act as applied to a farmer who
consumed his excess wheat harvest on his own farm); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47-51 (1939)
(upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Act of Feb. 16, 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1994)) against a facial challenge); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1, 11-12, 18 (1939) (holding that the Tobacco Inspection Act of Aug. 23, 1935,49 Stat. 731) was a valid
exercise of Congress's commerce clause powers and that the Act did not unlawfully delegate Congress's
legislative authority); Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937)
(upholding the second Frazier-Lemke Act, Act of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942, which had been
amended in the wake of constitutional invalidation in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank).
4. Act of Feb. 16, 1938, ch. 30, § 2, 52 Stat. 31, 31 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1282 (1994)).
5. Pub. L. No. 81-439, ch. 792, 63 Stat. 1051 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:333
price and income support for farmers. Just as the 1973 farm bill revolutionized the
traditional commodity programs by replacing parity6 with the "target price" and
"deficiency payment" mechanisms,7 the 19858 and 199CP farm bills expanded the
environmental arsenal of federal agricultural law by adding conservation reserve,"0
wetland reserve," acreage set-aside, and cross-compliance obligations under the
Swampbuster and Sodbuster programs."2
Inside this witches' brew of contradictory policies lies a legacy of legislative
failure. Market-oriented critics of the commodity programs criticize their harmful
impact on export prices, farm management practices, and the federal budget. 3
Agrarian populists condemn the distribution of government payments, which go
disproportionately to the largest, wealthiest farmers.4 One constant remains:
farmers are reinforcing their "legendary[ and ... well deserved" "reputation for
blind political resiste.nce to environmental regulation."'5 Even the conventional
view of farmers as "stewards of the land,"'16 a tradition so deeply rooted as to have
6. See 7 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (1994) (defining parity). See generally LLOYD D. TEIGEN,
AGRICULTURAL PARITY: HISTORICAL REvIEW AND ALTERNATIVE CALCULATIONS (1987) (USDA, Econ.
Research Serv., Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 571).
7. See Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Claude T. Coffman, Target Prices, Deficiency Payments,
and the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, 50 N.D. L. Rev. 299, 305-07 (1974).
8. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.).
9. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
10. See Conservation Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (1994).
11. See Wetland Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837-3837f (1994).
12. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3824 (1994). See generally, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Agricultural
Stabilization & Conservation Serv., 955 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1992) (clarifying the Swampbuster
provisions-of the 1985 farm bill); Petterson v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 194 (1986) (clarifying the acreage
set-aside rules); Linda A. Malone, An Historical Essay on the Conservation Provisions of the 1985 Farm
Bill: Sodbuster, Swanipb'*ster, and Conservation Reserve, 34 KAN. L. REV. 822 (1986); Linda A.
Malone, Conservation at the Crossroads: Reauthorization of the 1985 Farm Bill Conservation Programs,
8 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 215 (1989); Linda A. Malone, The Renewed Concern over Soil Erosion: The Current
Federal Programs and Pioposals, 10 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 310 (1989).
13. See, e.g., DON PAARLBERG, FARM AND FOOD POLICY: ISSUES OF THE 1980S, at 23-42 (1980).
14. See, e.g., INGOLI VOGELER, THE MYTH OF THE FAMILY FARM: AGRIBUSINESS DOMINANCE OF
U.S. AGRICULTURE 173-79 (1981). For an overview of the principal arguments over contemporary farm
policy, see Christopher R. Kelley, Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm Programs, 14 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 659 (1994).
15. MARTY STRANGE, FAMILY FARMING: A NEW ECONOMIC VISION 206 (1988); cf. JONI
MrrCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 1970) ("Hey farmer
farmer / Put away that D.D.T. now / Give me spots on my apples / But leave me the birds and the bees
I Please!").
16. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 159.2 (1990) (establishing the Iowa Department of Agriculture
and Land Stewardship); Hurd v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 499 (1978); Steven C. Bahls,
Judicial Approaches to Resolving Dissension Among Owners of the Family Farm, 73 NEB. L. REv. 14,
16 (1994) ("The family farmers' historic commitment to long term stewardship of the land is increasingly
valued by today's more cnvironmentally-conscious society."); Carol Ann Eiden, The Courts' Role in
Preserving the Family Farm During Bankruptcy Proceedings Involving FmHA Loans, 11 L. & INEQ. J.
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religious significance, 7 has been captured and redefined by overt opponents of
environmental protection in agriculture. 8
Despite the confusing policy directions, American agriculture and its discon-
tents 9 have reached a modest consensus: farming in the United States has become
dirty business. But even those who express the most "urgent concern over the
ecological aspects of agriculture" rarely, if ever, state it for its own sake." True
to their populist roots, today's agrarians are still fighting to preserve farm owners'
and operators' real incomes in a world of higher yields and declining production
costs - in other words, they are maximizing the returns on fixed human capital
invested in farm entrepreneurship." Earl Butz's most infamous proclamations -
"adapt or die"'  and "get big or get out"' - still leave a discordant ring in
agrarian ears.
What has changed is the nature of the rhetoric. Agricultural production and
environmental protection, once thought to be poorly related or even contradictory,
are now equated. One by one, voices once committed to agricultural fundamental-
ism in its purely economic form are beginning to extol the farm, especially the
small family farm, as an engine of environmental protection.u Even the definition
of sustainable agriculture reflects a subtle blending of environmentalism with
agrarian economic philosophy. Strictly defined, "[s]ustainable agriculture" consists
simply of "processes involving biological activities of growth or reproduction
intended to produce crops, which do not undermine our future capacity to
417, 423 (1993); N. William Hines, The Land Ethic and American Agriculture, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
841 (1994).
17. See generally Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1261, 1265-74 (1995) (describing the agrarian "stewardship" ethic as an outgrowth of the Judeo-Christian
story of Creation in the Book of Genesis).
18. See, e.g., Slawson v. Alabama Forestry Comm'n, 631 So. 2d 953, 955 (Ala. 1994) (describing
the so-called Stewards of Family Farms, Ranches, and Forests as an organization committed to
"promot[ing] stewardship among private landowners, to protect these landowners' private property rights
'by confronting environmental and political extremism in the public and/or political arena,' and to develop
and implement 'a national strategy designed to confront actions which threaten private property rights
of family farm, ranch, and forest owners'). For a criticism of farmers' increasing affinity for "property
rights" rhetoric and takings clause litigation, see Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six
Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 240-44 (1993).
19. Compare THEODORE SALOUTOS &JOHN D. HICKS, AGRICULTURAL DISCONTENTIN THE MIDDLE
WEST, 1900-1939 (1951) (describing episodes of unrest among American agriculture's losers throughout
the early twentieth century) with JIM SCHwAB, RAISING LESS CORN AND MORE HELL (1988) (collecting
angry stories by farmers who were hurt or bankrupted by the debt crisis of the 1980s).
20. Curtis E. Beus & Riley E. Dunlap, Conventional Versus Alternative Agriculture: The
Paradigmatic Roots of the Debate, 55 RURAL SOCIOL. 590, 595 (1990).
21. See generally Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809 (1995).
22. Earl L. Butz, as quoted in The Record Stockman, Mar. 10, 1955.
23. See A.V. KREBS, THE CORPORATE REAPERS: THE BOOK OF AGRIBUSINESS 404, 428 (1992)
(describing "get big or get out" as the slogan of "the Earl Butz school" of agribusiness); cf. JACK DOYLE,
ALTERED HARVEST 127 (1985) (revising Butz's slogan to "Get sophisticated or get out" in an agricultural
world increasingly driven by advanced biotechnology).
24. See Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and Firms,
45 DRAKE L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
19951
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successfully practice agriculture" and which do not "exhaust any irreplaceable
resources which are essential to agriculture."' It is a purely ecological concept.
But self-described sustainability advocates who are primarily concerned about "farm
size" have begun arguing that "the goal of sustainable agriculture programs should
be to serve small or family farmers instead of large corporate farms."'
B. Macroecology and Microecology
So rises the agroecological movement, the latest manifestation of the "new
agenda" in American agricultural policy, the latest battalion in the "zealous
coalition" that has advocated "food stamps, environmental programs, consumer
issues, and rural development" since the 1960s Agroecological reasoning follows
either or both of two distinct lines.' From a macroecological perspective, farming
per se is environmentally benign or even ameliorative. At the very least, agriculture
is environmentally superior to alternative land uses. Characterizing the agricultural
system as a complete, biologically driven organism, macroecological rhetoric
describes farmland, albeit privately owned, as a public good in itself. Stripped of
its food security aspects, the macroecological argument at heart suggests that
production agriculture is an affirmative environmental amenity.
A more fearsome fallacy may not exist in all of agricultural law. Together with
mineral extraction, agriculture is one of the most resource-depleting economic
activities.29 Even in its milder form, as an assertion that incumbent farmers provide
valuable "open space" and other unspecified "environmental benefits,"3
macroecological rhetoric falls to explain why the complete abandonment of farming
in a region might not be an environmentally preferable outcome."1
A second, "microe,.ological" variation on the agroecological theme focuses on the
difference between large and small farms. According to agroecological dogma, not
every farmer is an equally capable steward, and not every farm deserves the same
measure of environmental trust. Small farms are better, and small family farms are
best. Reducing farm sizes and dispersing farm ownership puts the fate of the
agricultural environment in the hands of self-employed managers rather than
uninspired farm employees. Agroecological integrity, in other words, depends on
the "eyes to acres ratio."32
25. Hugh Lehman et al., Clarifying the Definition of Sustainable Agriculture, 6 J. AGRIC. & ENvTL.
ETHics 127, 139 (1993).
26. COUNCIL FOR AGRic. SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND THE 1995
FARM BILL 9-10 (Special Pub. No. 18, Apr. 1995).
27. PAARLBERG, supra note 13, at 63.
28. See generally Chen & Adams, supra note 24.
29. See, e.g., Frank S. Popper, The Reinvention of the American Frontier, AMICUS J., Summer 1991,
at 5.
30. West Lynn Cretmery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2217 n.20 (1994).
31. See id. ("Dairy farms are enclosed by fences, and the decline of farming may well lead to less
rather than more intensive land use.").
32. WES JACKSON, ALTARS OF UNHEWN STONE 37 (1987).
[Vol. 48:333
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Family ownership completes the microecological package by tapping the power
of intrafamilial, intergenerational love: more so than bloodless corporate entities,
family owners conserve "natural, human, and financial resources . .. for [their]
heirs."33 Unlike Macduff, Shakespeare's virtuous Scotsman, the corporation "has
no children."' The unshakable faith in independent farm operators thinly conceals
a fear and loathing of corporate farm employees as "hireling[s]" who may and
should "be dealt with differently than those who [farm] on their own."35 Neil
Hamilton states the microecological argument favoring family farms in no uncertain
terms: "It is the farmers and their families who care about preserving the quality
of the land they farm and building an economically viable operation, through which
to accumulate wealth and acquire the resources with which to live."'
Such a pity, really, that none of this is true. Economic theory and substantial
empirical evidence subvert virtually every agroecological claim, especially those
based on farm size and ownership structure. Uninformed consumers have been
made to swallow the agroecological opium of the masses; the public forgets the
simple truth that "[flarming is not an environmentally benign activity."37 Genuine
friends of the earth should ask whether sugar cultivation anywhere in the United
States confers so much as one environmental benefit. Agriculture's vintage - its
sheer age as a human activity - obscures its long-term effects on the environ-
ment." Confronted with miscarriages and other tragedies attributable to polluted
(and unregulated) runoff, agriculture's likeliest victims blithely assume that "[t]he
ground filters everything out."39 The "small farm" variant of the agroecological
ideology is especially misleading, for "[s]mall-scale communities are seldom as
humane and ecologically sound" as microecological rhetoricians "portray them to
be."' If anything, smallness and family ownership bear a negative correlation to
environmental protection; nonfamily corporations outperform family landowners in
soil conservation and erosion control'
33. STRANGE, supra note 15, at 35.
34. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act IV, sc. 3, L 216 ("He has no children. All my pretty
ones? / Did you say all? 0 hell-kite! All? / What! all my pretty chickens and their dam, / At one fell
swoop?").
35. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 115 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
36. Neil D. Hamilton, Agriculture Without Farmers: Is Industrialization Restructuring American
Food Production and Threatening the Future of Sustainable Agriculture?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 613,
645 (1994) (emphasis added).
37. Chen, supra note 21, at 872; Jim Chen, The Agroecological Opium of the Masses, CHOICES, 4th
Q. 1995, at 16, 20.
38. See William Howarth, Legal Approaches to the Prevention of Agricultural Water Pollution in
England and Wales, 45 DRAKE L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) ("Until fairly recent times there was a
common belief that farming, as an activity conducted since the dawn of humanity, must be an
environmentally benign operation, since if it were not, the adverse effects would have been noticed long
ago.").
39. JANE SMILEY, A THOUSAND ACRES 259 (1991).
40. MARTIN W. LEWIS, GREEN DELUSIONS: AN ENVIRONMENTALIST CRITIQUE OF RADICAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM 91 (1992).
41. See Linda K. Lee, The Impact of Landownership Factors on Soil Conseration, 62 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 1070, 1073 (1980); Luther Tweeten, The Economics of Small Farms, 219 SCIENCE 1037, 1038
1995]
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As a matter of political economy, the illicit allure of the agroecological argument
exposes "sustainable agriculture" and other alternatives to the Green Revolution to
the vilest form of political capture,42 to the risk of being corrupted into the most
recent variant of agricultural fundamentalism.! At the very best, the rise of an
agroecological movement inhibits thoughtful analysis of agricultural policy. At the
very worst, fallacious agroecological reasoning poses a serious menace to greening
of American agriculture. "Unless we can decouple" sustainable resource manage-
ment and environmental protection "from issues of farm income and economic
viability," we will surely "make environmentalism contingent upon the pecuniary
[and political] preferences of [certain] environmentalists."" Even without the
environmental dimension, the "family farm" objective at the heart of economic
regulation of agriculture is scarcely coherent. Complex law demands and deserves
complex analysis: only by distinguishing agricultural regulation's economic and
environmental objectives can we hope to discern whether the law is succeeding.
This Article turns now to that task.
II. A Different Kind of Decoupling
There is no small irony in the use of federal farm bills to reform American
agriculture's environmental record. Price and income support for farmers have
harmed significant economic and environmental interests in agriculture. "It does not
require very sophisticated economic logic to show that [aid] provided directly to
farmers can actually reduce farm incomes and the demand for farm labor when
demand is inelastic.' Direct economic aid accelerates the infamous "agricultural
treadmill"'47 on which farmers continually adapt in a doomed race to economic
extinction." Likewise, the coupling of farm price and income supports to
(1983).
42. Cf. JANE SMILm', Moo 340 (1995) (quoting an out-of-control horticulture chairman at a fictional
land grant university: "Admit it! Admit it! Admit the Green Revolution was evil! Admit cocaine is the
ultimate cash crop! Admit your life is a bankrupt evil waste!").
43. See Donald E. Nroth, A Brief History and Assessment of Federal Rural Development Programs
and Policies, 25 U. MEMPIS L. REV. 1265, 1287 (1995) (stating that "li]t is too early to know exactly"
whether the "considerable political support and federal funding" for sustainable agriculture will merely
"result in another form of 'agricultural fundamentalism'"). On sustainable agriculture and other forms of
"alternative agriculture," see generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE
(1989).
44. Chen, supra note 37, at 16.
45. See Steven C. Bahls, Preservation of Family Farms - The Way Ahead, 45 DRAKE L. REV.
(forthcoming 1996); cf. J.W. Looney, The Changing Focus of Government Regulation of Agriculture in
the United States, 44 McRCER L. REV. 763 (1993) (conceding the possibility of contradictions within a
regulatory agenda of unprecedented scale and scope in American agricultural law).
46. Robert E. Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights and Agribusiness Research and Development:
Implications for the Public Agricultural Research System, 65 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 967, 975 (1983).
47. See generally WILLARD W. COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH AND REALITY 85-107 (1958);
WILLARD W. COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
378-95 (1979).
48. See generally Chen, supra note 21, at 851-59.
[Vol. 48:333
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production levels has pushed many farmers into monoculture and generally into a
habit of maximizing yield at any cost. Coupling thus distorts the distribution of
government benefits toward the rich and the allocation of natural resources in
farming beyond the limits of unsustainable use.49 The link between production and
levels of governmental support has even driven farm lobbyists to organize
themselves along commodity-specific lines, in order better to defend their
entitlements."0 These are not uniquely American phenomena. The European
Union's notoriously generous and protectionist Common Agricultural Policy5 has
given Europe soil nitrogen levels three times those of the United States5 2
Recent federal farm program reforms have introduced the term "decoupling" into
American agricultural law.53 The 50/92 and 0/92 provisions of the 1985 and 1990
farm bills stealthily effected a form of decoupling by allowing producers to collect
ninety-two percent of their expected benefits despite withholding program crops
from half or all of their enrolled acres.' "[Flew nonspecialists discerned" how a
program that "paid volunteers 92 percent of their benefits to plant [nothing] at all"
moved American farm policy toward "direct[] support [of] producer incomes,
undisguised by the complexities of loan rates and target prices."'5 The failed
Boren/Boschwitz decoupling proposals of the 1980s articulated decoupling's
regulatory vision in more direct terms: separating federal farm income support from
49. See Gordon C. Rausser & David Nielson, Looking Ahead: Agricultural Policy in the 1990s, 23
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 415,420-21 (1990); cf. WENDELL BERRY, THE GIFr OF GOOD LAND 116-17 (1981)
(arguing that a production-based approach to agriculture will automatically fail because it is based on
industrial assumptions without regard to "biology" and "human culture").
50, See Rausser & Nielson, supra note 49, at 420 (noting how "individual commodity organizations
[have] gradually replaced the more general, and previously predominant, farm advocacy organizations
as the primary vehicles for effective political expression" in the coupled political economy of American
agriculture).
51. See EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMMISSION, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ITS
REFORM (Eur. Doc. 1/1987); EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMMISSION, A COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
FOR THE 1990s (Eur. Doc. 5/1989); see also TIMOTHY BAINBRIDGE & ANTHONY TEASDALE, THE
PENGUIN COMPANION TO EUROPEAN UNION 48 (1995) (describing the Common Agricultural Policy as
"the most important ... policy" of the European Union "in terms of the number of people directly
affected, its share of the [Union's] Budget and the extent of the powers transferred from national to
European level").
52. See C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE
LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS 46 (1994); Monika Hartmann & Alan Matthews,
Sustainable Agriculture in the European Community: The Role of Policy, 8 F. APP. RES. & PUB. POL'Y
I1 (1993). Denmark, Germany, and the Benelux countries reported nitrogen levels as high as ten times
those of the United States.
53. See generally Tim T. Phipps et al., Decoupling and Related Farm Policy Options, in
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN A NEW DECADE 101 (Kristen Allen ed. 1990).
54. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1444f(c)(1)(E) (1994) (permitting a farmer who "devote[s] a portion of the
maximum payment acres for feed grains... to conservation uses" to receive 85 percent of the deficiency
payments attributable to those acres). Nqte that a 1993 amendment changed the 0/92 program to a "0/85"
program. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 1 103(1), 107 Stat. 312,
315 (1993).
55. WILLARD W. COCHRANE & C. FORD RUNGE, REFORMING FARM POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL
AGENDA 72 (1992).
1995]
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farm output will limit the market-distorting and environmentally harmful side effects
of the traditional commodity programs.' The Agricultural Market Transition Act
of 1996, which had passed the Senate and was awaiting action in the House as this
Article went to press, would implement the decoupling strategy in the wheat, feed
grain, and cotton programs.'
The continuing d..bate over decoupled income support has broadened to include
the notion of "green payments," or income support payments that are "recoupled"
with specific environmental dutiesO8 Agricultural policymakers on both sides of
the Atlantic have hungrily eyed the prospect of using green payments as a substitute
for traditional price and income support. 9 Green payments figure prominently in
European plans to reform "the inherent conflict between agriculture and the
environment" in a body of "agricultural policy ... focused primarily on price
supports."' Under the Agreement on Agriculture accompanying the recently
concluded Uruguay Round of world trade talks, 1 decoupled income support and
green payments are exempted from signatory states' obligations to reduce the
Aggregate Measure of Support to farmers,62 or "the annual level of support,
expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of the
producers of the basic agricultural product or non-product-specific support provided
in favour of agricultural producers in general."'
The time has come to recognize a different sort of "decoupling" in agricultural
regulation. The common practice of mixing environmental and economic objectives
in agricultural regulation frequently yields perverse legal outcomes. This politically
popular combination is often accompanied by a wickedly deceptive fallacy: the
belief that cultivation or animal husbandry is environmental protection. At the heart
56. See, e.g., Famy Farm Protection and Full Production Act of 1985, S. 1041, 99th Cong. 1st
Sess; 131 Cong. Rec. 5142 (May 1, 1985) (statement of Sen. Boschwitz, R.-Minn.).
57. See Agricultund Reform and Improvement Act, S. 1541, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 142 CONG. REC.
1191 (Feb. 9, 1996).
58. Cf. Karen R. Hansen, Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Need for an American Farm
Policy Based on an Integrated Systems Approach Recoupled to Ecological Stewardship, 15 HAMLIN- J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 303, 305 n.14 (1994) (invoking the term "recoupling' . . . in an effort to redirect" the
concept of "'decoupling'" "away from world trade and international competitiveness to a policy decision
regarding the proper conduct of the United States in terms of global environmental responsibility and
stewardship").
59. See, e.g., George Gunset, New GOP Leadership sharpens sickle with eye on farm aid, Cmi.
TRIB., Nov. 22, 1994, at 1; Alison Maitland, Call for "green" payments to replace CAP subsidies,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan, 6, 1995, at 5.
60. Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agro-Environmental Measures in the Common Agricultural Policy,
25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 927, 929 (1995).
61. See Agreement on Agriculture, openedfor signature Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 39 (1994) (GATT Sales
No. 1994-4).
62. See id annex 4:6 (decoupled income support payments); annex 4:12 (environmental payments).
63. Id. art. 1(a). See generally Norman W. Thorson, Protecting the Rural Environment - Is the
Grass Greener on the Other Side of the GATT?, 45 DRAKE L. REV. (forthcoming 1996); Jeffrey J.
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of every agroecological fallacy is the frequently invoked but rarely tested
assumption that small farm size and family ownership guarantee sound steward-
ship.' Time and again, however, the American experience with structural
regulation of agricultural markets has shown that "mere landownership does not
automatically give rise to 'stewardship."'"' The environmental performance of
agriculture is dictated by "the forces of the market" to the same degree as are the
structural characteristics of any industry, such as the "number of firms[,] ... the
degree of their integration .... and the dispersion in the sizes of the enterprises."6
"[R]egulatory attempts to influence" agriculture's environmental efficiency by
sustaining or even "increas[ing] the number of firms" in the industry are thus
"doomed to failure. '67 It is no longer sound legal analysis to assume that an
"agriculturally correct" market structure will also deliver the optimal package of
environmental amenities associated with agriculture.
Like most other types of economic and social legislation, regulation that blends
agricultural policy and environmental protection routinely eludes meaningful judicial
scrutiny. Thanks to the extremely deferential posture of rational basis review under
the due process' and equal protection clauses,' an economically and environmen-
tally foolish statute may nevertheless be constitutional." Thus, state laws restricting
corporate ownership and operation of farms have withstood constitutional
challenges,7 despite mounting empirical evidence that such laws accomplish none
of their stated structural objectives' and may actually harm a state's farming
interests by encouraging capital to migrate to less restrictive states.7
As a result, judicial approval signals little (if anything) about the environmental
impact of laws affecting agriculture. Lobbyists, legal critics, and other players in
the predominantly legislative arena where agricultural policy is shaped need a more
64. See, e.g., STRANGE, supra note 15, at 35, 38 (contrasting the "resource conserving" model of
family fanning with the "resource consumptive" model of industrial agribusiness); Bahls, supra note 16,
at 17-18 ("[F]amily ownership of agricultural land... promotes responsible stewardship of soil, water,
and other resources."); Eiden, supra note 16, at 423; cf Looney, supra note 45, at 793 n.175 (describing
family farming as an emblem "of 'moral virtue' and as a 'symbol' of independence and self-reliance").
65. Chen, supra note 21, at 835.
66, Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets,
I YALE J. ON REG. 111, 121 (1984).
67. Id.
68, See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963).
69, See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101-03 (1993).
70. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96-97 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("[A] law can be both economic folly and constitutional.").
71. See, e.g., MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330,332-33 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 814
(1991); State ex reL Webster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 801, 805-06 (Mo. 1988); Omaha
Nat'l Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269, 282-83 (Neb. 1986).
72. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24 subd. 1 (1990) ("[lIt is in the interests of the state to
encourage and protect the family farm as a basic economic unit, to insure as the most socially desirable
mode of agricultural production, and to enhance and promote the stability and well-being of rural society
in Minnesota and the nuclear family.").
73. See Chen & Adams, supra note 24; Richard F. Prim, Saving the Family Farm: Is Minnesota's
Anti-Corporate Farm Statute the Answer?, 14 HAMINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 203 (1993).
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realistic guidepost by which to measure the effectiveness of agroecological
regulation. We may profitably adapt the first amendment standard for judicial
review of laws restricting expressive conduct, commonly known as the O'Brien
test.74 The "apparently limitless variety of [agricultural] conduct" cannot legitimate-
ly qualify as environmental protection "whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby" to affect the environment. 5 Rather, just as every
expressive act combines "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements,"'7 every agricultural
structure and practice combines economic exploitation with environmental alteration.
All farmers and some agricultural regulators understand this inherent dualism: the
"proprietary interest" in farmland represents "the bulk of [private] wealth" in
farmers' hands,' but the greater society enjoys no corresponding legal mechanism
for safeguarding its interest in agricultural land as a renewable natural resource. The
farmer as proprietor fully capitalizes all gains into the land's resale value. Absent
extraordinary legal measures, however, the very same farmer need not - and will
not - internalize the costs of environmental damage due to his or her farming
activities.
No matter how attractive the image of farmers as "stewards of the land" may
seem, we simply cannot expect any private actor to protect social interests in the
environment. Nor can the delicate project of environmental protection be blithely
entrusted to lawmakers and law enforcement agents, for "[p]oliticians and
bureaucrats have incentives that do not always correspond to the public interest." '
This is especially true within an agricultural community with a long history of
reflexively favoring on-farm interests over all others."
In order to overcome private greed and political corruption, "green" scrutiny of
agricultural statutes must be quite skeptical of claims that structural, economic
measures will improve the environment. An agricultural statute must "target[] and
eliminate[] no more than the exact [economic] source of the [ecological] 'evil' it
seeks to remedy.""3 Often the environmental advocate can expose a fatal inconsis-
tency in the scrutinized statute. Time and again, constitutional cases applying a
standard of intermediate scrutiny have shown that contradictory legislation is the
fastest way to undermine a legal policy's asserted justification."' To state the point
74. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
75. id. at 376.
76. Id.
77. Looney, supra note 45, at 767; cf. PAARLBERG, supra note 13, at 40 (noting that "large
landowning [farm] operators" have enjoyed the greatest success in "capitaliz[ing] [federal) program
benefits into land values").
78. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. Rev.
791, 806 (1994); see also Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 59 (1992).
79. Cf. Chen, supra note 21, at 815 ("Why, despite the triumph of consumer welfare model in
virtually every other facet of American economic thought, does producer welfare continue to dominate
agricultural policy in the United States?").
80. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 804 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Supreme Court's evident decision to eliminate
a narrow tailoring requirement of this sort from intermediate scrutiny under the first amendment).
81. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,204 (1976) (comparing a ban on male purchases of beer
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somewhat differently, we should subject agroecological policies to the same sort of
searching environmental assessment prescribed under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) for major federal actions.'
III. Four Agroecological Fallacies
American law exhibits no fewer than four distinct types of "agroecological
fallacies." Each fallacy is rooted in a tendency to confuse environmental and
economic goals in agricultural regulation. And each fallacy is readily exposed by
a straightforward application of the O'Brien test as adapted to this regulatory
context.
A. Money for Nothing
First, statutes that are putatively designed to protect the environment are often
more honestly described as programs for boosting commodity prices and farm
incomes by restricting output. For example, the Soil Conservation Act of 1936'
described wheat as a "soil-eroding" crop and soybeans as a "soil-conserving"
crop,' in apparent defiance of agronomy but conveniently in accord with the
income-support provisions of the invalidated Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933.u
More recently, paeans to the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)' and to
related conservation initiatives' as measures for retiring marginal farmland and
restoring wildlife habitat have blunted more realistic assessment of the CRP as a
cost-ineffective means of farm income support.8 Between 1987 and 2003, the
much-vaunted CRP will have spent $19.5 billion in rental payments on temporarily
retired farmland, in exchange for environmental benefits valued between $6 billion
and $13.6 billion. 9 Under the unforgiving standard of "a social welfare stand-
with Oklahoma's failure to ban male possession or consumption of beer, even of beer purchased by 18-
to 20-year-old females); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (concluding
that an all-female nursing program's educational rationale was undermined by the state university's failure
to prevent men from auditing courses).
82. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
83. Ch. 104, 49 Stat. 1148 (1936).
84. IL §§ 7-8.
85. Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-626 (1994)),
invalidated by United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); see Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural
Philosophies and Policies in the New Deal, 68 MINN. L. REv. 333, 348-49 & n.65 (1983) ("The
connection between surpluses and soil depletion [under the Soil Conservation Act] was far from direct.
For example, wheat, a soil-conserving crop, was due for acreage reduction while soybeans, probably the
most soil damaging of all crops, was omitted from the program.").
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (1994).
87. See Wetland Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837-3837f (1994); Erodible Land and Wetland
Conservation and Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3824 (1994).
88. See generally Raymond J. Watson, Jr., Conservation Reserve Program: What Happens to the
Land After the Contracts End?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 733 (1994).
89. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSERvATION RESERVE PROGRAM: COsT-EFFEcrivENESS
Is UNCERTAIN 3, 5 (GAO/RCED-93-132, 1993).
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point," CRP is a failure: it has failed to "produce[] benefits sufficient to cover its
costs."' To be sure, neither the environmental benefits9' nor the fiscal costs' of
the CRP can be quantified with an absolute degree of confidence. What is certain
is that the program excels at putting money in farmers' pockets. Individual CRP
contracts pay as much as $5.6 million, and the program broadens its legislative
support by spreading benefits across numerous states and congressional districts. 3
In areas of high CRP enrollment, land values increased by $62 to $132 per acre."
If indeed farmers are "stewards" of the land, they are among the most richly bribed
guardians of environmental integrity.95
Like their tort law predecessors, the right-to-farm statutes now in force in all fifty
states,9 "green payments" such as those made under the CRP violate the "polluter
pays" principle, the foundational bedrock of economically sensitive approaches to
tort law and environmental regulation.' Freehold farmers know precisely the
balance between productivity and erodibility on their own land; the commodity
program phenomenon known as "slippage" shows how farmers retire their least
productive acres when ordered to set aside acreage for conservation or supply
control purposes9 As the cheapest cost avoiders, farmers should bear the initial
brunt of environmental compliance costs.w When they are bribed to avoid
impairing the productive capacity of their own land, the law is plainly defining the
"right" to farm as the superior entitlement.
B. The Milky Way
Second, explicit farm income support programs are frequently justified as
environmental measures. Farm advocates ascribe affirmative "green" power to
90. COUNCIL FOR ACRIC. SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, THE CONSERVATION RESERVE: A SURVEY OF
RESEARCH AND INTEREST GROUPS 14 (Special Pub. No. 19, July 1995).
91. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 89, at 3.
92. See id. at 4 n.3.
93. See KENNETH A. COOK, So LONG, CRP 1-2 (1994).
94. See Robbin Shoemaker, The Conservation Reserve Program and Its Effects on Land Values
(1989) (USDA, Econ. Relearch Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 554).
95. See Chen, supra note 17, at 1330.
96. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(d) (1994); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 43-26-103 (1993). See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Revisited: Judicial
Consideration of Agricultural Nuisance Protections, 14 J. AGRIC. TAx'N & L. 195 (1992); Neil D.
Hamilton & David Bolte, Nuisance Law and Livestock Production in the United States: A Fifty-State
Analysis, 10 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 99 (1988).
97. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Guido
Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (justifying the imposition of liability on polluters because
polluters tend to be "chepest cost avoiders" or "best bribers"). Cf. Jim Chen, The Constitutional Law
Songbook, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 263,264 (1994) ("Public goods? Let's subsidize! / "Polluter pays":
Those words are wise.") (singing "The Coasean Creed" to the tune of "Jesus Loves Me").
98. See PAARLBERG, supra note 13, at 38-39.
99. But see Thorson, supra note 63 (supporting the GATT-endorsed regime of "green payments"
despite conceding that such payments probably "violate the 'polluter pays' principle, arguably the most
important and widely accepted canon of international environmental law").
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transparently economic measures. In its more general manifestation, this
agroecological fallacy asserts that fanning preserves open space and the nation's
farmland base as a food production reserve. Thus the Farmland Protection Policy
Act"° imposes NEPA-like procedural obligations on the federal government,
ostensibly because a country hyperproductive enough to use food as a foreign policy
weapon 0' may otherwise lose its "ability . .. to produce food and fiber in
sufficient quantities to meet domestic needs."'" This defense of fanning as a
Maginot line against suburban sprawl usually overstates the extent to which "open
space" is disappearing 3 and may well reflect little besides the pastoral lifestyle
preferences of agricultural analysts fortunate enough to be living in the exurbs.
A more aggressive variation on this agroecological theme portrays farmers as
peculiarly talented and caring stewards of natural resources. The smaller the farmer,
the cleaner she supposedly is. Defenders of farm income support, especially for
smaller farm entrepreneurs, routinely argue that farming produces an enormous
amount of positive environmental externalities. 4 "Family farm" rhetoric abounds;
empirical environmental evidence does not.
State-law support for dairy producers represents the most extreme instances of
this agroecological fallacy. Milking the public fisc in the name of environmental
and consumer protection is a long but rather tawdry American tradition. The
Filled Milk Act, which sparked the controversy that generated the "discrete and
insular minorities" theory of constitutional review,"° was defended in its time as
a statute that "preserved the 'fertility of American soil,"' despite the complete lack
of "evidence that the fertility of soil would suffer a whit by a marginal decrease in
the number of dairy cows due to competition" from coconut-based filled milk."°
States have so often resorted to similarly flawed defenses of their local dairy
100. 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4209 (1994). See generally William L. Church, Farmland Conversion: The
View from 1986, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 521; Valerie M. Fogleman, The Farmland Protection Policy Act:
Stillbirth of a Policy?, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 563.
101. See, e.g., Export Enhancement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1325; Export
Enhancement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-429, 106 Stat. 2186; Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 68 Stat. 454 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1738r (1994)).
102. 7 U.S.C. § 4201(a)(3) (1994).
103. See U.S. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LAND EVALUATION AND
SITE ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (1983) (casting doubt on the frequent claims that American farmland is
being lost at a high rate to urbanization); JULIAN SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1981) (same);
Gregg Easterbrook, Vanishing Land Reappears, 258 ATLANTIC 17 (July 1986) (same).
104. See Chen & Adams, supra note 24.
105. See generally, e.g., ALTON LEE, A HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAXATION 12-27 (1973)
(surveying the history of the dairy industry's efforts to portray rival products as "adulterated" and
therefore fit to be banned from grocery shelves); Geoffrey Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the
Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83 (1989) (documenting the
extent to which dairy interests greased Congress and state legislators during the New Deal era); Geoffrey
Miller, The Industrial Organization of Political Production: A Case Study, 149 J. INST. & THEORET.
ECON. 769 (1993).
106. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
107. Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 397, 421.
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industries that much of the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
can be written in milk.a
To this day, "dairy regulation... levies the heaviest taxes against poorer people
to subsidize mainly richer farmers."'" Agroecological ideology adds intellectual
insult to this pecuniary injury. For example, in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy,""
Massachusetts levied a tax on all wholesale milk but impounded the proceeds for
the benefit of an income-enhancement program limited to in-state dairy produc-
ers.' The Commonwealth defended its discriminatory tax scheme by citing "the
'local benefits' of preserving the Massachusetts dairy industry," including the
protection of "unique open space.... 2 Even if Massachusetts had been able to
marshal evidence of environmental benefits, it could not have justified such overt
discrimination against interstate commerce."' In this case, the Supreme Court
found reason to doubt the link between dairying in Massachusetts and the
preservation of open space; Justice Stevens noted evidence suggesting that "the
decline of farming may well lead to less rather than more intensive land use."".4
The Court thus exposed how Massachusetts' agroecological argument rested on not
one, but two faulty presuppositions: (1) that dairy farming is a benign and, indeed,
affirmatively desirable form of land use and (2) that any alternative to the
preservation of lands currently committed to dairying would harm the environment.
C. An Unthinking CAAP
Third, whenever a law threatens the economic interests of certain subclasses of
farmers, particularly smaller freehold farmers, the law's opponents decry the law as
primarily a threat to the environment and only secondarily (if at all) as an economic
menace. Whereas the dairy advocates in West Lynn Creamery had wielded the
agroecological argument as a sword in favor of farmer-friendly legislation, this
strategy consists of using agroecological rhetoric as a shield against external legal
pressure. The California Agrarian Action Project's (CAAP) assault on farm
mechanization research during the late 1980s epitomizes this strategy."' As an
108. See, e.g., We.t Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976);
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951); Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Milk Control Bd. v.
Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935);
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898); cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 504 (1934)
(repelling a substantive due process attack on state-law regulation of milk prices).
109. Robert Tempest Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, The Pricing Policies and Goals of Federal Milk
Order Regulations: Time for Reevaluation, 23 S.D. L. REv. 662, 663 (1978).
110. 114S. Ct. 2235 (1994).
111. Seeid. at 2209-11.
112. Id. at 2217 &n.20.
113. See id. at 2217 n.20; City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
114. Healy, 114 S. Ct. at 2217 n.20 (citing J. FOSTER & W. MACCONNELL, AGRICULTURAL LAND
USE CHANGE IN MASSACHUSETTS 1951-1971, at 5 (Research Bull. No. 640, Jan. 1977); A. DAUGHERTY,
MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED STATES: 1987, at 4, 13 (Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 643, 1991)).
115. See California Agrarian Action Project, Inc. v. University of California, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1245
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exercise in persuasive reasoning and rhetoric, CAAP's lawsuit to stop farm
mechanization research at the University of California backfired; it undermined the
agroecological claim to coherence as perhaps nothing else could. The CAAP
litigation effectively revived a decade-old argument that land grant universities'
research decisions were subject to NEPA review.' In "equat[ing] small farmers'
economic viability with environmental protection,""' 7 the CAAP argument ran
squarely into the teeth of the well established NEPA principle that socioeconomic
consequences on farm labor does not constitute a "primary impact on the physical
environment."".
As farm mechanization was in Earl Butz's time, so advanced biotechnology is
today."' The vicious agrarian campaign to prevent and, later, to reverse the Food
and Drug Administration's (FDA) approval of recombinant bovine somatotropin
(rbST) represented a paradigmatic application of agroecological rhetoric as a shield
for farm interests.' Although the FDA, a notoriously slow and conservative
agency blamed for the deaths of human patients awaiting drug approvals,' had
studied rbST over the course of a decade, Congress and several state legislatures
second-guessed the federal government's food and drug safety experts by passing
statutes designed to delay or discourage the use of this drug.' This episode is
especially disturbing because the agroecological objections to this form of
biotechnology obscured the palpable environmental benefits of rbST use." To
(Ct. App. 1989); Chen, supra note 21, at 839-41; Looney, supra note 45, at 815-16.
116. See Robert S. Catz, Land Grant Colleges and Mechanization: A Need for Environmental
Assessment, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 740 (1979); Howard S. Scher et al., USDA: Agriculture at the
Expense of Small Farmers and Farmworkers, 7 TOLEDO L. REv. 837 (1976); Lawrence A. Haun,
Comment, The Public Purpose Doctrine and University of California Mechanization Research, I 1 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 599 (1978).
117. Chen, supra note 21, at 840.
118. Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1978).
119. See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for
Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 587 (1993); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 249-57;
Looney, supra note 45, at 813-19.
120. See Approval of Sterile Sometribove Zinc Suspension (Posilac@), 58 Fed. Reg. 59,946 (1993)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 51.600, 522.2112).
121. See, e.g., HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFrrS AND RISKS 9 (1983); David Leo Weimer, Safe-and-
Available Drugs, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION 239, 241 (Robert W. Poole, Jr., ed. 1982). Under the
FDA's painstaking review process, the average human drug takes ten years and $87 million to develop.
See NATIONAL COMM'N ON ORPHAN DISEASES, FINAL DRAFr REPORT 97 (Feb. 24, 1989); Cynthia A.
Thomas, Reassessing the Orphan Drug Act, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 413, 420 (1990).
122. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 1105(c)(2), 107
Stat. 312, 317 (1993) (set forth as a note to 7 U.S.C. § 1446e (1994)) (imposing a 90-day moratorium
on rbST sales and suspending a previously scheduled reduction in federal milk price subsidies); Act of
May 10, 1994, ch. 632, S.F. No. 2913, art. 2, §§ 13-14, 1994 Minn. Laws 1911-13 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 32.013 (1992) and adding MINN. STAT. § 32.75 (1994)) (authorizing the voluntary labeling of
milk from cows not treated with rbST).
123. See Dale E. Bauman, Bovine Somatotropin: Review of an Emerging Animal Technology, 75
J. DAIRY SCl. 3432, 3447 (1992); Chen, supra note 21, at 868-71; D.E. Johnson et al., The Environmen-
tal Impact of Bovine Somatotropin Use in Dairy Cattle, 21 J. ENvTL. QUAL. 157 (1992).
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argue, as rbST's opponents did, that milk is in surplus is also to concede surpluses
in two other categories: dairy cows and dairy farmers. Cows are pollution, pure and
simple - walking, cud-chewing emitters of manure, urine, and methane. The
environmental benefits from a reduction in the U.S. dairy herd are substantial, albeit
at the expense of some dairy farming jobs. An environmentalist approach focuses
on the reduction in pollutants and plant protein consumed by dairy cows; an
agroecological approach decries the loss of dairy farming jobs."
Again, NEPA supplies the needed dose of proper environmentalism. In approving
rbST, the FDA followed its established policy of disregarding socioeconomic impact
in fulfilling its NEPA obligations.' This posture, consistent with prevailing
NEPA regulations governing the content of environmental impact statements,'
best advances the larger societal interest in the environment. In a political culture
that values threatened jobs over all else, giving substantial weight to short-term
socioeconomic disturbances is tantamount to abdicating the imperative of
environmental protection. When proposed governmental action will aid or at least
avoid harming the environment, neither NEPA nor good ecological sense warrants
a consideration of purely socioeconomic concerns." 7 Whether any particular
"technological advance" might be "worth its attendant risks" to incumbent farming
interests is "quite different" and quite distant from the environmental inquiry into
whether the gains from a projected technological advance "are worth a given level
alteration of our physical environment or depletion of our natural resources."'" It
may well be that employment is, especially from a left-of-center perspective on the
macroeconomic dimensions of the law, "the economic problem.""'2  When
technology comes to the farm, however, we ought not overlook potential gains in
production agriculture's environmental performance merely because change threatens
some farming jobs.
D. All Wet
Fourth, agrarian lobbyists frequently wield environmental arguments to justify
agricultural exceptions from a generally applicable system of economic regulation.
The Reclamation Act of 1902,3' one of the most spectacular failures in the history
of American agricultural law, supplies a stunning case study of this agroecological
fallacy. The Act's attempt to limit acres irrigated by federally sponsored reclamation
124. For a complete. analysis of the rbST controversy, see Chen, supra note 21; Chen, supra note
37.
125. See National Environmental Policy Act: Policies and Procedures: Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg.
16,636, 16,648 (FDA Apr. 26, 1985).
126. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1995) (providing that "economic or social effects are not intended
by themselves to require preparation of [an] environmental impact statement" under NEPA).
127. See Missouri Coalition for the Envt. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 866 F.2d 1025, 1031-32 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1194 (W.D. Wis. 1995)
(upholding the FDA's decision to approve rbST without preparing an environmental impact statement).
128. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 776 (1983).
129. Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recession? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1224-25 (1993) (emphasis in original).
130. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616yyyy (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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projects to 160 acres per holding failed miserably."' Eighty years after the passage
of the original Act, Congress finally resorted to market-based pricing of reclamation
water,' but only as a "hammer" to prompt compliance with a relaxed acreage
limitation."'
The Central Valley Project Improvements Act of 1992 (CVPIA) 34 targeted yet
another fatal flaw in the original Reclamation Act: the "use it or lose it" rule
embodied in the 1902 Act's provision that "the right to the use of water acquired
under the ... Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated."'13 Section 3405(a)
of the CVPIA authorizes recipients of federal reclamation water "to transfer all or
a portion of [their] water ... to any other California water user or water agency,
State or Federal agency, Indian tribe, or private nonprofit organization."" By
providing "the least costly way of meeting new demands for water," the CVPIA
promised "sizeable benefits from market transfers."'37 The CVPIA also took a
second market-oriented step toward reclamation reform: the introduction of a three-
tiered pricing system based on the full cost of reclamation and the denial of
automatic renewals of 40-year water delivery contracts.
These strides toward market-based pricing of water, however, stopped cold at the
farm. During the lobbying season that preceded passage of the CVPIA, a new
coalition of "environmentalists and rice producers realized that rice growing results
in both environmental benefits and degradation": rice production provides
"[w]aterfowl habitat and groundwater recharge," but it also generates "air pollution
from burning, pesticide contamination of urban drinking water and water diversion
at certain critical times of the year."'3 One would never know the mixed
environmental impact of irrigated rice cultivation in the Central Valley from the
CVPIA, for the statute effectively exempts rice farmers from the three-tiered pricing
scheme:
The Secretary [of the Interior] shall waive application of [the three-
tiered pricing scheme] as it relates to any project water delivered to
131. See 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1988) ("No right to the use of water for land in private ownership shall
be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner, and no such sale shall
be made to any landowner unless he be an actual bona fide resident on such land, or occupant thereof
residing in the neighborhood of said land .. "); Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275,285-
86, 297 (1958).
132. See Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. §§ 373(a), 390aa to 390zz-1, 422e, 425b,
485h, 502 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
133. See id. § 390cc(b); Peterson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 806-14 (9th
Cir.). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003 (1990). See generally Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of
Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 657 (1989).
134. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575,
§§ 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706-31 [hereinafter CVPIA].
135. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1988).
136. CVPIA, supra note 134, § 3405(a), 106 Stat. at 4709-10.
137. B. Delworth Gardner & John E. Warner, The Central Valley Project Improvement Act and
Water Markets: Two Steps Forward - One Step Back, CHOICES, Ist Q. 1994, at 4, 6.
138. Richard Howitt, Water Markets, Individual Incentives and Environmental Goals, CHOICES, 1st
Q. 1994, at 10, 11.
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produce a crop which the Secretary determines will provide significant
and quantifiable habitat values for waterfowl in fields where the water
is used and crops are produced.'
In short,_agroecological interests successfully lobbied to keep an uninterrupted flow
of irrigation subsidies for rice farmers. The putative ecological justification -
preservation of waterfowl habitat - effectively presupposes a definition of
environmental protection under which "wildlife" includes only those animals that
humans may legally kill."
IV. A Transparent Solution
A final and utterly debilitating agroecological fallacy remains to be explored.
Antonio Carrozza, arguably the founder of modem agricultural legal scholarship in
Europe, unwittingly hints at the nature of the fallacy and of the underlying fear that
motivates this final rhetorical stance. In his special address to the 1995 congress of
the Comit6 Europ6en de Droit Rural, Professor Carrozza described "the introduction
of environmental law into agricultural law" as perhaps "the announcement of the
destruction of the structures on which traditional agricultural law is founded.''
In a more defensive posture, he asked:
[E]ven the industrial entrepreneur must confront the particular liabilities
that limit his production in the name of provisions imposed for the
protection of the environment and of human health. And strict
preventive.., measures are imposed principally on the industries that
are dangerous by definition. If that is true, and it is indisputably the
case, one must ask why there are no legal conferences organized and no
books written about the introduction of the concept of environmental
protection into the realm of industry and, more generally, the realm of
commercial law. Why are we always concentrating on the agricultural
and rural environment? Why aren't manufacturers put to the task as is
the case with farmers?'
The answer, of course, is that the industrial sector has long borne the brunt of
command-and-control environmental regulation. Unlike agriculture, which enjoys
environmental exemptions both explicit and implicit, virtually every other
139. CVPIA, supra note 134, § 3405(d), 106 Stat. at 4713.
140. Contra Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
entered into force, Jul 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249 (1973); Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115
S. Ct. 2407 (1995); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
141. Antonio Carozza, Speech Before the 18th Congress of the Comit6 Europ6en de Droit Rural
(CEDR), St. Catherine's College, Oxford, England (Sept. 20, 1995) (on file with the author). Professor
Carrozza delivered hi; speech in French; what appears in text is my translation of the paper circulated
by Professor Carrozza at the CEDR congress.
142. Id.
143. Compare, for instance, the several states' right-to-farm statutes with the backhanded definition
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GET GREEN OR GET OUT
industry in the United States must face a comprehensive battery of environmental
obligations. To the extent that generally 'applicable environmental laws are fully
enforced on the farm, the resulting expansion in the capital intensivity of farming
as a business will simply accelerate the modem trend toward greater scale and
greater concentration in agriculture. Adapt and die: the big get bigger, and the
small get city jobs.'" Get green or get out.
We thus confront our final agroecological fallacy, the notion that farms deserve
to be exempt from laws protecting the environment. Proponents of this fallacy
cannot protect it against the devastation wreaked by a single question: If fanning
is so clean, why aren't farmers bound by the environmental laws applicable to the
rest of us? Even Congress is forsaking its exemptions from generally applicable
laws.4 Why can't farmers meet even Congress's low standards of civic responsi-
bility?'"
Traditional agriculture quakes at the idea that environmental law will come to the
farm, decoupled from a commitment to preserving some semblance of an
agricultural market dominated by numerous small farms. Hence the drive to
articulate and defend a coherent body of agroecological law, a legal system that
promotes environmental integrity only to an extent that preserves existing farm jobs,
and no more. But the linkage of environmental and economic issues in agricultural
regulation impedes the honest resolution of both types of problems. Damage to
natural resources does not depend on the identity of the tortfeasor, but these
agroecological fallacies encourage separate and unequal solutions to the environmen-
tal challenges posed by agriculture. The frequently unsupported presumption that
farming affirmatively benefits the environment cripples efforts to find scientific
justifications for an entire host of laws regulating the health, safety, and environ-
mental impact of agriculture and agribusiness.
Existing mechanisms in American and international law can cure the disease that
is agroecological reasoning. The dormant commerce clause analysis typified by
West Lynn Creamery'47 insists that states (1) justify protectionist legislation on
verifiable environmental grounds and (2) identify quantifiable costs and benefits so
that judicial reviewers can meaningfully assess whether legislation's burden on trade
justifies the benefits attained through the agroecological legislation. 4 The
Uruguay Round's new Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards agreement (SPS)
of agriculture as nonpoint source pollution under the federal Clean Water Act. Of course, a concentrated
animal feedlot operation will be regulated under the Act's point source pollution provisions. See
generally Concerned Area Residents for the Envt. v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
144. See Chen, supra note 21, at 857 ("Onward roll the inexorable trends toward overproduction,
toward human exodus from farming, toward concentration of productive resources within the food
system.").
145. See generally Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3.
146. Cf. Luther Tweeten, Sector as Personality: The Case of Farm Protest Movements, AGRIC. &
HUMAN VALUES, Winter 1987, at 67 (exploring the psychological pathology of agrarian self-dealing).
147. See \Vest Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
148. See id. at 2214-18.
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requires a similar type of judicial review.149 There is, in fact, growing reason to
believe that the domestic legal standard expressed in the Supreme Court's dormant
commerce clause cases and the international standard governing the SPS accord are
effectively alike."l ' What drives both legal regimes is the concept of transparency,
the idea that economic protectionism ought to be exposed for voters and consumers
at home and all the world to see.' How strange it must seem to the agroecologist,
this notion of using science rather than supposition to make the world safe not only
for agriculture, but also for health, safety, and environmental regulation.
Agrarians everywhere, whether staid traditionalists or suave agroecologists, are
allied in their opposition to "agricultural industrialization," an unequivocal evil that
I have been accused of advocating.'52 My line of argument, so it is asserted,
makes "'little claim farmers will be better off, or the land will be better treated, or
rural communities will be [economically] healthier.""" Farm jobs be damned, but
the land will be cleaner. When proponents of conventional agrarian thought are pre-
pared to embrace my agenda of bringing the long arm and iron fist of environ-
mental law to the farm, they will have standing to preach a "greener than thou"
gospel.
Millions for environmental defense, but not one dime in agrarian tribute.
Confronted with a constantly shrinking federal fisc and an increasingly polluted
natural world, we can no longer afford to condition environmental protection on
such luxuries as subsidies for entrepreneurial opportunities in farming. We can no
longer afford to couple environmental protection with agricultural protectionism.
The urge to disguise the economic regulation of agriculture as environmental
protection is understandable, for it obscures the otherwise undeniable "welfare law"
flavor of most schemes for enhancing farm incomes. As with food stamps, general
assistance, and every other form of interclass wealth transfers, however, the public
deserves an opportunity to debate agricultural regulation on its full economic and
ecological merits." This is the reform that "decoupling" promises the much-
maligned federal commodity programs. In an age of increasing pressures on the
federal fisc and the terrestrial ecosystem, we ought to approach the entire body of
agricultural law with greater respect for economic and environmental interests alike.
149. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, opened for
signature, Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, supra note 61, at II-A-I.
150. See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's Eye
View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1431-40 (1994).
151. See generally, e.g., IN WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATION-
AL TRADE (Michael IA. Hart & Debra P. Steger eds. 1992).
152. See George Anthan, Prof advances his radical view, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 14, 1996, at JlI
(quoting and criticizing Chen, The American Ideology, supra note 21; Chen, Of Agriculture's First
Disobedience and Its Fruit, supra note 17; and Chen, The Agroecological Opium of the Masses, supra
note 37).
153. Id. (quoting Neil Hamilton, the author of, inter alia, works cited in notes 18, 36, 96, and 119,
supra).
154. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 22 (1971) (describing and
analyzing cross-subsidization of public utility services through "internal subsidies" as a species of
taxation and public finance).
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